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Introduction 
 
 
Red Sea: Connecter and Divider 
Disruption Waves from the Arabian Gulf to the Horn of Africa 
Annette Weber 
The Red Sea is a vital pathway for goods, people, arms, and livestock. European trade 
with Asia passes through here as well as oil from the Gulf to the Mediterranean, and a 
sizeable amount of global marine cargo is hauled through the Suez Canal and the Red 
Sea into the Indian Ocean. In addition to its significance as a trade route, the Red Sea 
is a lane for migration between the Gulf and the Horn of Africa and a bridge for roving 
terrorists. Its water connects the Horn of Africa with the Gulf countries, although it 
also separates African and Arab political and social cultures. Moreover, many issues 
are contested in the Red Sea region, ranging from military control to political Islam. In 
order to avoid further rifts between the Horn of Africa countries as a consequence of 
the disruptive politics of the Gulf, the Horn needs to perceive itself as a region and find 
common interests rather than becoming fragmented and weakened. The stability of the 
Horn of Africa as well as the security of its trade routes are of vital interest to European 
countries and economies. 
 
Today the Horn of Africa is among the most 
conflicted regions in the world. Civil wars 
in Sudan and South Sudan, frozen border 
conflicts between Ethiopia and Eritrea, as 
well as border conflicts between Sudan and 
South Sudan are constant sources of insta-
bility and violence. The region is the birth-
place of the two newest African states 
(Eritrea in 1993 and South Sudan in 2011). 
Furthermore, jihadist groups have been 
operating in the region since the mid-1990s, 
resulting in conflicts in Somalia and several 
severe attacks in the region – mainly in 
countries along the Swahili Coast. Ethiopia 
has experienced waves of public uprisings 
and demonstrations in response to a state 
of emergency that has weakened the gov-
ernment. 
On the other side of the shore, recent 
developments are shaking the assumption 
of political and social stability in the Gulf 
countries. The recent arrests of more than 
200 influential individuals – including 
princes and other members of the royal 
family – in Saudi Arabia in November on 
allegations of corruption and embezzle-
ment are unprecedented and call the estab-
lished social contract into question. The 
split in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
last June tore at the fabric of the GCC, which 
is far from being mended in the near future 
and might leave insurmountable rifts be- 
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Map: Red Sea Region 
hind. There are several root causes of the 
higher tension levels and increased nerv-
ousness in the Gulf that can be identified: 
the Saudi-led war in Yemen (2015–), the 
tensions between the Gulf and Iran, as well 
as the plunge in oil prices in June 2014. 
Beginning with the Yemeni war and the 
resulting GCC crisis, the tectonic shifts on 
one side of the Red Sea have changed the 
power balances on the adjacent shores. 
The changes are being felt most brutally in 
Ethiopia, which, before the war in Yemen, 
was the default hegemon in the region. 
Simultaneously, other countries such as 
Sudan and Eritrea are rising from obscurity 
due to the attention being given them by 
the Gulf countries, Europe, and the United 
States, albeit for different reasons. 
Relevance: Regional and Global 
Trade routes and investment. The Red Sea is 
one of the main trade routes for German 
exports: 16 percent of German exports go to 
Asia, and 20 percent of its imports are from 
there. The main passages go through the Gulf 
of Aden, the Red Sea, and the Suez Canal. 
Trade between the two shores of the Red 
Sea is of great importance for the region: 
Somalia’s main exports are livestock and 
charcoal to Saudi Arabia. More than 70 per-
cent of Saudi investments in agriculture 
and food go to Africa, primarily Sudan and 
Ethiopia, with the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE) closely following in investment. 
Piracy became a massive obstacle for trade 
in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden in the 
mid-2000s. With an absent and later weak 
state in Somalia since 1991, the enterprise 
of hijacking merchant ships became lucra-
tive; in 2008 alone, 111 attacks – including 
42 successful hijackings – took place. More 
than 263 crew members were held hos-
tage just in 2009. An EU maritime force 
was established in 2008 with a mandate 
to secure the World Food Programme’s 
humanitarian shipments for the people of 
Somalia as well as to secure a corridor for 
merchant vessels passing through the Gulf 
of Aden. Other countries such as Russia, 
South Korea, China, and Iran have also sent 
vessels to secure their trade routes. 
Military bases. Djibouti has the largest 
number of military bases of foreign nations 
on the African continent. The US base, Camp 
Lemonnier, has thousands of soldiers sta-
tioned there, and there are reports about 
the United States expanding its geostrategic 
interests in Eritrea as well. China has also 
built its first base in Djibouti, which has 
made the United States nervous. NATO, 
France, Japan, Germany, and Saudi Arabia 
also have military bases in the small coun-
try. Turkey just opened its largest overseas 
military base in Mogadishu in October. 
The security impact of the GCC crisis 
can be illustrated with the Eritrean Port 
of Assab. The port is south of the country, 
roughly 50 km from the Ethiopian border, 
but 600 km from the Eritrean capital. 
Before the war between Ethiopia and Eri-
trea, the Port of Assab was used by Ethiopia. 
After the war, it was allegedly used by Iran 
in the mid-2000s and is now being lent to 
 
Note: The boundaries and names shown on this map are only 
for illustration purposes. SWP is not taking any position on 
disputes about territories or exact line of borders. 
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the UAE as a naval base for Operation Re-
storing Hope in Yemen. In September 2016, 
Houthi rebels fired grenades at the port; a 
month later they fired on a US war ship in 
the Red Sea before the United States retali-
ated with rockets on Houthi positions on 
the Yemeni coast. This exemplifies the re-
gional as well as international dimensions 
of the Red Sea and its acute vulnerability. 
Between the Port of Assab and the Yemeni 
coast, the distance is roughly 60 km, but 
the smallest strait, the Bab-el-Mandeb, only 
measures 27 km between the Arabian Pen-
insula and the Horn of Africa. This triggers 
security concerns that ripple beyond the 
Red Sea. The security for shipping lanes – 
currently assigned to EU Naval Force Ope-
ration Atalanta in the Gulf of Aden – needs 
to be assessed, and further measures to pre-
vent terrorist operations, including using 
ships to block the strait, need to be enacted. 
Terrorism/jihadism. The significance of the 
Red Sea as a security nexus became appar-
ent when al-Qaida operatives crossed the 
Gulf to attack US embassies in Nairobi and 
Dar es Salaam in 1998. Despite the demise 
of the Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and Syria, 
jihadism is thriving in the Horn of Africa 
and Yemen. The attack on the USS Cole by 
al-Qaida on the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) 
in 2000 was the first terrorist operation in 
the Red Sea, followed by war in Somalia 
and attacks in Kenya and Uganda. There is 
no formal cooperation between jihadists on 
the Arabian Peninsula and al-Shabaab in 
Somalia; however, jihadists, weapons, and 
ideologies travel freely through the Bab-el-
Mandeb Straight. The missile attack by 
Houthis last July on a UAE vessel involved 
in the Yemeni coalition shows that the Red 
Sea could easily become a battleground. 
Migration. The Red Sea plays a significant 
role in migration between the two shores. 
However, migration from the Horn of 
Africa to the Arabian Peninsula is rarely 
just an attempt to reach Europe but rather 
a migration movement to the Gulf itself. 
Hundreds of thousands of migrants from 
the Horn are seeking employment in the 
Gulf countries. Many have lived there for 
three or four generations and supply the 
financial backbone for many Horn of Afri-
can economies through their remittances. 
Whereas the majority of Sudanese and 
Ethiopians came to the Gulf as regular 
working migrants (in construction and 
domestic services), a smaller number crossed 
the Red Sea or the Arabian Sea from Punt-
land to reach Yemen and then cross into 
more affluent Gulf countries. 
Three Waves of Gulf Disruption 
In the last couple of years, there have been 
three waves from the Gulf to the Horn of 
Africa. The first wave came with the fall 
in oil prices in 2014 and the need for eco-
nomic diversification. The second was cre-
ated by the decision of some African states 
to fight the Houthis in Yemen under a 
Saudi-led alliance in 2015. The last wave, 
in 2017, was created by the rift among the 
three leading GCC members – Saudi Arabia 
and the UAE on the one side, and Qatar on 
the other – forcing African states to take 
sides, which has had a fragmenting effect 
on the already fragile region. 
Whether these waves will lead to further 
disruption in the Horn of Africa or consti-
tute the need for collective security has yet 
to be seen. What is unambiguous, however, 
is the tectonic shift in power that the waves 
have produce in the Horn. In the following, 
the three waves and their consequences 
regarding shifts in power in the Horn of 
Africa are examined further while focusing 
on the cases of Ethiopia, Sudan, and Eritrea. 
First Wave: 
Economic Changes and Diversification 
The first wave came with the fall in oil 
prices in 2014. The Gulf countries needed 
to diversify their economies and did so by 
various measures. In addition, they changed 
their food security strategies and started 
investing in food production and agro-
business across the shore in the Horn of 
Africa. Besides the investment in agro-busi-
ness, the UAE’s DP World invested heavily 
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in the ports along the Red Sea and the Gulf 
of Aden and is now administering to most 
ports in the region, from Kismayo to Dji-
bouti. There is increasing nervousness 
about what such a monopoly could mean 
if future pricing policies are put out of the 
reach of state governments. 
Ethiopia, a country heavily reliant on agro-
investments from the UAE, India, and Saudi 
Arabia as well as European countries, feels 
cornered from the activities on the other 
side of the Red Sea. The landlocked hege-
mon, by default, lost its access to the Port 
of Assab in its war with Eritrea (1998–2000). 
The increasing dependency – from port 
access to investment as a source of foreign 
currency – in combination with the in-
creased militarization of its surroundings 
has made Ethiopia nervous. For one, after 
the October 2016 demonstrations in larger 
cities and rural areas alike, the government 
reacted harshly: Hundreds of people were 
killed and thousands were imprisoned. The 
root causes of the demonstrations included 
land-rights issues and political participa-
tion. In addition, Ethiopia’s historical infra-
structural project, the Grand Ethiopian Re-
naissance Dam (GERD), has opened another 
wound in its already unharmonic relation-
ship with Egypt. Ethiopia is accusing Egypt 
of meddling with politics in Eritrea and 
South Sudan as well as in the domestic 
politics of Ethiopia in retaliation for the 
Renaissance Dam, which challenges Egypt’s 
claim to a fixed quota of the Nile waters. 
The GERD is about to be completed in 
2018 and will provide electricity to Ethio-
pia and Sudan. The dam is a fundamental 
irritation to the Egyptians and has already 
led to announcements by Egyptian officials 
of military action to stop its completion and 
filling. The power afforded Egypt through 
its GCC affiliation could tip the delicate 
balance in the region even further. Sudan 
currently has a strong position because it is 
a member of the alliance in the Yemeni 
war, which could create a predicament for 
the rival powers of Egypt and Ethiopia. 
Sudan also has Saudi Arabia and the UAE 
as investors in agriculture. Hundreds of 
thousands of Sudanese migrants are work-
ing in the Gulf, and their remittances are 
essential for the economy and their families 
back home. 
The Saudi and UAE maritime bases in 
Eritrea and Djibouti as well as the massive 
investments in agriculture by Gulf coun-
tries in the Horn of Africa countries reflect 
the ties between security and economic 
interests. However, the region around the 
Red Sea does not perceive itself to be a 
region, nor are there efforts to establish a 
collective security or common trade archi-
tecture, which could counter – or at least 
buffer – the impact of the Gulf waves of 
disruption. 
Second Wave:  
War in Yemen 
The second wave was created by the deci-
sion of some African states to fight the 
Houthis in Yemen under a Saudi-led alli-
ance. Unlike Egypt, which is supporting 
the war but not sending troops, Sudan and 
Eritrea sent troops and provided a naval 
base for the alliance in Assab. This has led 
to a rise in status of the two Horn of Africa 
countries, which had previously been 
politically isolated and in dire need of cur-
rency to boost their economies. Saudi 
Arabia is relying on allies from the Horn 
in its war in Yemen. Besides military bases 
being provided in Djibouti (Saudi Arabia) 
and Eritrea (UAE), Sudan and Eritrea are 
contributing troops and receiving foreign 
currency in exchange. The normalization 
process resulting from the Saudi coalition 
as well as European interest in cooperation 
on irregular migration has helped the gov-
ernments in Khartoum and Asmara to 
regain power domestically and strength-
ened their regional standing. 
Sudan plays an equally active role in the 
Saudi alliance in Yemen. There are reports 
of more than 400 Sudanese soldiers having 
been killed in Yemen, and it is assumed 
that the number of soldiers sent there is in 
the thousands. In addition, the Yemeni war 
has functioned similarly to the final battles 
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of the Ghaddafi regime in Libya, from which 
Darfur rebels walked away with scores of 
arms, money, and ammunition. In the war 
in Yemen, members of Sudan’s Rapid Sup-
port Forces are allegedly being sent for 
training and to earn money. This military-
economic link between the war in Yemen 
and Darfur and the wider Sahel region has 
so far been unexplored. 
Third Wave:  
GCC Split – and the Role of Political Islam 
The rift among the three leading GCC mem-
bers – Saudi Arabia and the UAE on the one 
side, and Qatar on the other – created the 
last storm in the Horn of Africa, with coun-
tries being forced to take sides, resulting in 
a fragmenting of the already fragile region. 
Tectonic shifts. There are tectonic shifts 
occurring in the crisis landscape around 
the Red Sea. The discord among the coun-
tries of the GCC not only disturbs relations, 
economic flows, and trust on the Arabian 
Peninsula, it also has critical effects on the 
Horn of Africa. The shores of the Red Sea 
are moving closer together as a result of the 
war in Yemen, the migration of people, the 
trade route, and roving jihadis. 
New conflicts erupted in 2017 in the 
Gulf region among GCC members. Saudi 
Arabia and the UAE wanted to coerce Qatar 
to follow their anti-Iranian regional agenda. 
Qatar refused to follow suit, and diplomatic 
as well as economic and trade relations were 
cut, leaving Qatar isolated. Beyond the inner-
Gulf problems that this crisis has brought, 
it has heavy repercussions for the broader 
region, specifically across the Red Sea in the 
Horn of Africa. Qatar was a mediator in the 
Horn, such as for the border issues between 
Eritrea and Djibouti as well as in Darfur. 
Eritrea refused a request by Saudi Arabia 
and the UAE to cut ties with Qatar, but later 
went ahead and publicly criticized the coun-
try. After the critique from Eritrea and the 
siding of Djibouti with the other GCC coun-
tries, Qatar recalled their troops from their 
peacekeeping mission in the border dispute 
between Eritrea and Djibouti. 
A similar problem is likely to arise in 
peace mediations in Darfur, which are cur-
rently chaired by Qatar. Although Sudan 
was able to remain neutral and support 
Kuwait’s efforts to mediate between the 
GCC countries, Sudan’s dependency on 
Saudi Arabia and the UAE might force it 
to take sides against Qatar. Moreover, the 
crisis among the GCC countries is further 
disrupting the Horn of Africa region. 
The Economy of Political Islam 
Although Saudi Arabia and the UAE are 
investors in agricultural projects and the 
UAE is administrating almost all ports 
on the African shores of the Red Sea, the 
Saudi’s aggressive push of Salafism is not 
looked upon favorably – both in Christian- 
and Muslim-majority countries in the Horn 
of Africa. One aspect of the GCC split that 
has a potential impact on the Horn of 
Africa is the clash of ideologies. This will 
most likely manifest itself in Somalia and 
Sudan first. The battle between Salafism 
and other forms of political Islam – includ-
ing the various branches of Egypt’s Muslim 
Brotherhood – might bring more conflict to 
the Horn than is currently being suggested. 
In Sudan, this is reflected in the struggles 
of the Islamic movement to retain power 
and the trend of the younger generation 
joining the so-called Islamic State rather 
than following the political Islam of Hassan 
al-Turabi – in power since 1989 – and the 
National Islamic Front. The increasing 
number of madrasas and mosques paid for, 
and prayed in, by Saudi Salafi preachers is 
visible in Sudan, despite the government’s 
friendly relations with the Muslim Brother-
hood. Sudan was supportive of President 
Mohamed Morsi’s election in Egypt and 
hosted several members of the Muslim 
Brotherhood who fled after General Abdel 
Fattah el-Sisi took power in Cairo. Many 
of them fled further to Qatar. Numerous 
intellectuals and members of the Islamic 
movement – inside and outside the govern-
ment in Khartoum – therefore feel much 
closer to Qatar and disagree with the Saudi 
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school of Islam (Wahabism), but for eco-
nomic and political reasons, they cannot 
come out in favor of Qatar. However, Sudan 
has remained neutral and supports the 
mediation efforts by Kuwait. 
Similarly, the quest for a dominant ideol-
ogy could hit Somalia hard. The political 
landscape is dominated by political parties 
affiliated with branches of the Muslim 
Brotherhood. The competing ideology in 
Somalia is provided by the jihadist teach-
ings of al-Shabaab. However, it is not yet 
clear how an increase in Salafi mosques 
and schools would shape the future of 
Islam and politics in the country. Another 
factor is the influence of the Turkish 
schools of political Islam in the country 
as well as their scholarship programs for 
Somali students. 
Political Consequences 
Most apparent is the rift inside Somalia and 
between Somalia and Somaliland. Three 
semi-autonomous provinces of Somalia cut 
ties with Qatar, whereas the government in 
Mogadishu sided with the government in 
Doha. The GCC split directly weakened the 
central government and led to further frag-
mentation in the country. Two of the prov-
inces have ports managed and owned by 
the UAE, as does northeastern Somaliland, 
all of which sided with Saudi Arabia. Even 
more influential is the high number of 
Somali expats living and working in the 
Gulf – on whose remittances many families 
in Somalia rely. Prioritizing the alliance 
with the investors over the unity of the 
country will have lasting consequences 
for the stability in Somalia. 
Sudan fears that an emboldened Egypt 
could derail the GERD dam in Ethiopia and 
force Sudan to publicly side with Egypt. 
Whereas the Yemeni coalition brought the 
necessary economic boost and political 
recognition for Khartoum to be self-con-
fident and strong, the GCC crisis has 
presented Sudan with a quandary. 
In the case of Sudan, much will depend 
on developments following the United 
States’ recent partial lifting of economic 
sanctions in early October. However, the 
government in Khartoum feels emboldened 
by the alliance with Saudi Arabia and the 
UAE in Yemen as well as by the normaliza-
tion resulting from migration cooperation 
with the EU. Already there is a sense of re-
luctance by Khartoum to reengage in peace 
talks with Darfur and the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement/-North in Kordofan 
and Blue Nile due to this perceived “new 
normal” by Khartoum. 
These political tradeoffs come with a 
price, which will be paid by neighbor-
ing Ethiopia. Addis Ababa is home to the 
African Union, and Ethiopia has been the 
chair of the regional organization Intergov-
ernmental Authority on Development for 
more than a decade. It is leading in 
economic growth and infrastructural 
investment and is Europe’s closest ally in 
migration management. However, the 
Yemeni war and its alliances across the 
shores of the Red Sea have changed this 
position for Ethiopia, whose position has 
begun to weaken due to the militarization 
of the Red Sea shores by the UAE, close 
contact with Ethiopia’s arch enemy, Eritrea, 
and the elevation of Egypt – a serious 
contender for regional power. It could also 
bring about the hardening of a front in the 
Horn of Africa through alliances with 
either the Saudi–UAE axis or Qatar, which 
is the odd one out in the GCC. Considering 
the instability in the region, this is risky. 
An additional geostrategic interest by the 
United States in the Red Sea could turn the 
balance of power even further away from 
landlocked Ethiopia toward more authoritar-
ian and repressive regimes, such as Eritrea. 
The Region and Beyond 
The crisis nexus is spanning across the Red 
Sea into the Sahel region. On the other shore, 
it has reached relations between the GCC 
and Iran and is reverberating beyond the 
region. 
Iran is accused of supporting the Hou-
thi militias, who drove Yemeni President 
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Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi into exile in 
Saudi Arabia. Iran has also kept up good 
relations with Sudan – Iran allegedly co-
owned an arms and ammunition facility 
in Sudan (Yarmouk), which was bombed by 
Israel in 2012. As part of the negotiations 
with the CIA on counter-terrorism, the 
government in Khartoum was asked to cut 
their ties with Iran in 2016. Keeping Iran 
out of the region is of interest to Saudi 
Arabia, the United States, and Israel, but 
it limits Sudan’s strategic relations. 
Egypt has influence on the Red Sea – 
primarily, but not solely, because of their 
control of the Suez Canal. How significant 
this control can be on international trade 
could be seen during the 1967–1975 block-
ade, when – as a reaction to the Six-Day 
War with Israel – Egypt stopped all ship-
ping trade through the canal. The tensions 
between the two contenders – Ethiopia and 
Egypt – for regional power are fueled by 
the spillover from the GCC crisis. Whereas 
Egypt is seemingly gaining power through 
its alliance with Saudi Arabia, it lacks 
trust, influence, and strong relations in 
the Horn of Africa region and clout in 
the Gulf. 
Turkey has positioned itself clearly as a 
“brother in need” to Somalia and Qatar. It 
has the biggest military base in Somalia, is 
in charge of the port as well as the airport 
in Mogadishu, and it has developed close 
relations with Sudan. The government in 
Ankara has no problem with Iran and is 
closer to Russia than any country in the 
Gulf. In recent regional power shifts, 
Turkey is a mover and has placed its geo-
strategic cards well. 
Israel has an interest in the Red Sea and 
bombed alleged arms convoys near Port 
Sudan heading for Hamas territory in 2009. 
Three years later, Sudan complained to the 
UN Security Council that Israel was bomb-
ing the Yarmouk facility, close to Khar-
toum. Israel argued that the facility was 
an Iranian munitions factory supplying 
weapons to Hamas in the Gaza Strip. The 
growth of Iran’s influence does not benefit 
Jerusalem’s interests. 
The increasing significance of Gulf coun-
tries’ politics for the Horn of Africa is rever-
berating in the Red Sea region and far 
beyond. 
Repressive Regimes – 
Hard to Maneuver 
External actors often overestimate the in-
fluence they have on one side of the Red 
Sea or the other. Given the authoritarian 
systems prevalent on both shores, their 
interests are less regional and more focused 
on the stability of their regimes. This makes 
it harder to establish a system of collective 
security. For outside actors, it is prudent to 
engage with regional organizations in an 
effort to dissolve tensions. 
None of the countries in the region are 
democratic. However, the Gulf countries 
are far more anti-democratic than most 
of their counterparts on the African shore. 
The political foundations of the Kingdoms 
and Emirates in the Gulf mainly remain 
stabile due to family relations, clientelistic 
and rentier systems, and the absence of 
freedoms. This model is hardly relevant in 
the Horn of Africa. However, an increase 
in political influence from the Gulf and 
the legitimization of reduced freedoms and 
repressive strategies should be a worrying 
sign for the citizens of the Horn of Africa. 
Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Saudi 
Arabia already have the means to repress 
any attempts at transformation. In Somalia, 
statehood is fragmented, and governance 
is far removed from the state apparatus. 
The government of Sudan is involved in 
two civil war fronts, and there is an arrest 
warrant for its president from the Inter-
national Criminal Court with charges of 
war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
Europe’s influence is limited in the 
region, as is the influence of the world’s 
powers. Waning US political influence, the 
rise of China in economic, infrastructural, 
as well as military matters in the region, 
and the role of middle powers such as Iran 
and Turkey bring an explosive mix to the 
region. 
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The interests of Europe and Germany, 
in particular, are clear: securing the trade 
routes through the Red Sea, keeping chan-
nels of communication open with all stake-
holders, and engaging with Horn of Africa 
countries in matters of irregular migration. 
Analyzing the Yemeni war and engaging 
in a negotiated solution should be para-
mount – the military engagement of the 
Saudi coalition and the United States is 
detrimental to a diplomatic approach. The 
escalation of sectarian hostilities between 
the Sunna and Shia – as currently being 
displayed in the GCC crisis – as well as a 
widening rift between countries and popu-
lations in the Horn are dangerous and 
counterproductive. 
Europe can promote itself as a partner in 
support of a regional approach, furthering 
economic cooperation and conflict preven-
tion rather than fragmentation and geopo-
litical escalations. Europe can provide tech-
nical expertise in water management and 
agro-industries as an alternative to the esca-
lation of a Nile water-quota war between 
Egypt and Ethiopia. Inclusion and political 
participation will ultimately engage citi-
zens with their leaders, not repressive poli-
cies to ensure a status quo. 
Fighting irregular migration has to be 
a long-term investment in the region’s dy-
namics. The management of expectations 
is needed rather than the promise of quick 
solutions for bad governance, war, famine, 
and drought. Otherwise, the political trade-
offs for supporting the security apparatuses 
of repressive governments will yield very 
little stability. 
The perception of the Horn of Africa as a 
region and the need for collective security 
would be preferable to further fragmenta-
tion and should be supported by Germany 
and the European Union. 
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